Extant literature demonstrates that participating policies mitigate shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts in stock insurance firms. However, extending the argument in Mayers and Smith (1994) , the authors formally show that participating policies also exacerbate the shareholder-manager incentive conflicts in stock insurance firms. In this article, the authors test whether hypotheses derived from agency theory explain the usage of participating life insurance policies by stock insurers. The authors' results are consistent with the argument that participating policy usage is dictated by the trade-off between the mitigation of the contracting costs of risk shifting and underinvestment, and the exacerbation of the incentive conflicts between managers and shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
Stock insurers may sell participating insurance policies, also sometimes referred to as mutual contracts (Marshall, 1974) . Participating policies enable policyholders to participate in the profits of the insurance firm through dividend payments to policyholders. With such mutualization, policyholders of even stock insurance firms hold, at least in part, a claim on the insurer's residual cash flows. Issuing participating policies is one of several ways in which stock insurers may assemble mutual contracts without changing their organizational form (Doherty and Dionne, 1993) . Mayers and Smith (1981) were the first to suggest that participating policies play a role in reducing agency costs associated with the shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict in stock insurance firms. Pursuing this line of inquiry, Garven and Pottier Sudha Krishnaswami is associate professor of finance in the Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business Administration, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, La. Steven Pottier is associate professor of risk management and insurance at the University of Georgia, Athens. The authors thank Richard MacMinn (the editor) and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions that have improved the article substantially. All errors remain their responsibility.
(1995) develop a formal analytical model to demonstrate that participation rights in insurance policies resolve the risk-shifting problem that arises due to shareholderpolicyholder incentive conflict. 1 By issuing participation rights to policyholders, stock insurers transfer an equity stake to policyholders, which, in turn, partially merges the role of shareholder and policyholder and thereby resolves the risk-shifting problem.
Participating policies may also mitigate another type of shareholder-policyholder agency conflict-the underinvestment problem. 2 The underinvestment problem is particularly severe for firms with high leverage, i.e., firms with low capital ratio and firms in financial trouble such as ones that have experienced a drop in asset value (Mayers and Smith, 1987) . Because a participating policy bundles an option on the assets with a regular policy, for a given value of the liabilities, the fixed component of the liabilities is smaller in participating policies than in nonparticipating policies. Furthermore, if asset value falls, the induced increase in leverage is smaller in firms that issue participating policies than in firms that issue only non-participating policies. Thus, participating policies also mitigate the underinvestment problem. 3 While participating policies may mitigate the costs due to shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict, Mayers and Smith (1994) argue that they also exacerbate the shareholder-manager agency problem by reducing the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in disciplining the manager. They argue that participating policies hamper takeovers because the participating policyholders can capture a part of any post-takeover efficiency gains accruing to the bidder. In this article, the authors formally demonstrate how participating policies exacerbate another dimension of the shareholder-manager incentive conflict. In a model in which managerial effort is positively correlated with profitability, the authors show that managers exert less effort when the firm issues participating policies than when the firm issues only nonparticipating policies. Agency theory therefore suggests that participating policies would be more likely in firms whose costs of shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict dominate the costs of shareholder-manager incentive conflict.
Drawing implications from the extant literature, the authors empirically examine the usage of participating insurance policies among stock insurers from an agency theory perspective. The authors first study the determinants of the extent of usage of participating policies among stock insurers that have life insurance policies in force. The authors then separately examine the factors that influence the likelihood that a stock 1 The risk-shifting problem arises because of the adverse incentives of limited liability. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976) argue that in firms that face a fixed liability, shareholders have an incentive to undertake risky projects or substitute riskier ones for less risky ones because they have unbounded upside potential but face only bounded downside potential due to limited liability. In the context of this article, this mis-incentive is anticipated by the policyholders, and the cost of risk shifting is imposed on the shareholders at the time of policy issuance. 2 In firms with relatively large fixed liabilities, because shareholders receive only cash flows that remain after paying off the liabilities, they will accept only projects whose NPV exceed the liabilities. As a result, managers will forgo some positive NPV projects. This is the underinvestment problem. Because this is rationally anticipated by the policyholders at the time of the policy issue, the costs of underinvestment are imposed on the shareholders. 3 The authors thank an anonymous referee for this point.
insurer would issue participating policies and the factors that affect the extent of participating policy usage in insurers that have at least some participating policies in force. Because the authors focus only on stock insurers, the authors can better control for potential effects of regulatory, accounting, and ownership structure differences (see Mayers and Smith, 1994) .
The authors' work is related to the empirical literature on insurer organizational form that focuses on the differences between stock and mutual insurers (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1981 , 1986 , 1988 Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993; and Pottier and Sommer, 1997) , and the differences among various types of stock insurers (Mayers and Smith, 1994) . The authors extend this literature by analyzing the firm-specific determinants of the extent of participating policy usage within stock insurance firms. The decision regarding the extent of participating policy usage is similar to the decision regarding optimal ownership structure in that both decisions entail a tradeoff between the costs of shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts and the costs of shareholder-manager incentive conflicts.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the second section, the authors develop a simple model that illustrates the adverse effect of participating policies on the shareholder-manager agency conflict. This model, coupled with the results in the literature that participating policies mitigate shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict, presents an agency theory related trade-off for stock insurers using participating policies. Based on this trade-off, the authors develop some empirical implications regarding participating policy usage. In the third section, the authors describe the variables that proxy for the factors that explain the cross-sectional variation in participating policy usage. In the subsequent sections, the authors present the empirical methodology, the results, and some concluding comments.
AGENCY THEORY AND PARTICIPATING POLICIES
The incentive conflicts that arise among policyholders, managers, and shareholders generate agency costs. 4 Extant literature argues that contract design and ownership structure are alternative ways to control these incentive conflicts. The application of agency theory to insurance has focused on the differential costs and benefits of these control mechanisms.
The literature argues that the stock ownership form more efficiently controls the shareholder-manager conflict, while the mutual form more efficiently controls the shareholder-policyholder conflict (Mayers and Smith, 1981 , 1988 . Thus, stock ownership forms should be more prevalent in activities in which managers have relatively more opportunities to impose costs on the shareholders, while mutual forms should be more prevalent in activities where shareholders have relatively more opportunities to impose costs on the policyholders.
In a stock insurance firm, because the shareholders control the investment decision and because the policyholders have a fixed claim, the shareholders have an incentive 4 Agency costs are costs incurred in attempting to control incentive conflicts and include monitoring, bonding, and other contracting costs as well as any residual loss that may remain after optimal control mechanisms are applied (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . to overinvest in risky investments, or equivalently, substitute riskier investments for less risky ones. This problem is known as the risk-shifting problem or the asset substitution problem in the agency theory literature. Because the policyholders rationally anticipate these mis-incentives, the costs of overinvestment are imposed on the shareholders at the time of policy issuance (via the price of the insurance policies). Garven and Pottier (1995) show that participating policies may mitigate the costs associated with the risk-shifting problem. They argue that with participating insurance policies, the policyholders' claim may be viewed as risky debt plus a call option. That is, the policyholders not only have a fixed claim but also can share in the upside payoff with the shareholders. Hence, participating policyholders dilute the shareholders' claims when a risky project pays off. This in turn mitigates the shareholders' overinvestment incentives. The authors are thus able to show that by partially merging the roles of policyholder and shareholder, participating insurance contracts help control the costs of the shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict.
Participating policies may also mitigate the underinvestment problem, another type of policyholder-shareholder agency conflict. In firms with relatively large fixed liabilities, because shareholder claims are junior to these fixed liability claims, they will accept only projects in which the cash flows exceed the liabilities. As a result, managers will forgo some positive NPV projects. As in the risk-shifting problem, because these incentives are rationally anticipated by the policyholders at the time of the policy issue, the costs of underinvestment are imposed on the shareholders. The underinvestment problem is more severe for firms with high leverage, i.e., firms with low capital ratio and firms in financial trouble, such as ones that have experienced a drop in asset value. Because a participating policy bundles an option on the assets with a regular policy, for a given value of the liabilities the fixed component of the liabilities is smaller in participating policies than in nonparticipating policies. Also, if asset value falls, the induced increase in leverage is smaller in firms that issue participating policies than in firms that issue only nonparticipating policies. Therefore, participating policies also control the underinvestment problem in stock insurance firms.
Although issuing participating policies mitigates the shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts, it exacerbates another important agency conflict in the firm. By giving call options to policyholders, the control mechanisms that limit the ability of managers to operate in an opportunistic manner become less effective. Mayers and Smith (1994) argue that participating policies adversely affect the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. They argue that because a part of the potential gains to a bidder from a takeover accrues to participating policyholders, the effectiveness of the market for corporate control at reigning in the shareholder-manager conflict is diminished. In fact, below, the authors of this article present a simple model that formalizes another reason that the shareholder-manager incentive conflict may be more pronounced in firms that issue participating policies. Consequently, stock insurers that issue participating policies should be less effective at controlling the shareholder-manager conflict than stock insurers that do not issue participating policies.
The authors consider a model in which the manager of a stock insurance firm is given stock-based compensation for his efforts at managing the firm. The authors assume that effort is costly to the manager, and the expected payoff to the firm is positively related to the level of effort exerted by the manager. In this setting, the authors show that in a firm with participating policies, the optimal effort exerted by the manager is strictly lower than the effort exerted by the manager of a firm that issues only nonparticipating policies.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. When a manager selects his or her optimal effort level, he or she maximizes his or her share of the residual cash flows after paying off the fixed liabilities. In a firm with participating policies, because the policyholders may be viewed as holding a call option on the firm's assets, they capture a share of the residual payoff going to the manager. This, in effect, reduces the manager's marginal returns from exerting effort, and thus his or her optimal effort level is lower in a firm with participating policies than in a firm that issues only nonparticipating policies.
Model
Consider a one-period, two-date model, where on date 0 there are two stages. In the first stage, the firm decides to issue either participating or nonparticipating insurance policies, and it receives some proceeds from the policyholders. Once the nature of the policy is determined, the manager selects the optimal effort level e in the second stage on date 0. The authors assume that the manager's effort decision is made to maximize managerial value. The manager is given stock-based compensation and is assumed to own a fraction a of the firm's shares. Because the shareholders receive the proceeds from the policyholders on date 0, their objective at the time of insurance policy issuance is to maximize ( ) ( ) However, once the insurance policy has been issued and the funds ( ) Pe from the policyholders have been received, the manager's effort decision is made only to maximize his or her date 1 residual cashflows net of effort cost; i.e., the manager maximizes ( ) ( ) ( )
Ce is the manager's cost of incurring effort e. The authors assume sequential rationality on the part of the policyholders in that, at the time they give the funds to the firm, they correctly anticipate the optimal effort level of the manager (given the nature of the policy). Thus, the insurance policies are fairly valued on date 0. 
In stage 2, when the manager selects the optimal effort level, he or she maximizes
The optimal effort level NP e is such that
Case 2: The firm decides to issue participating policies.
Let the firm select participating policies that payoff g fraction of the net earnings
when the net earnings (profits minus fixed liabilities) exceed X. In other words, the participating policy is "in-the-money" when the firm's net earnings exceed X. The present value of the date 1 residual cashflows to the shareholders is ( ) 
Again, in choosing the optimal effort e, the manager maximizes ( ) 
Let NP ee = , so that Equation (7) is satisfied. Substituting NP ee = in the left-hand side (LHS) of Equation (8), we have on the LHS of (8)
Expression (9) is less than zero because 1 ,,0,0 X ag >Π> , and 0.
Thus, for Equation (8) to be satisfied, the LHS of (8) must increase. But because , ag , and X are positive constants, to increase the LHS of (8) 
PNP ee <
The preceding proposition shows that although participating policies mitigate the risk-shifting and underinvestment problems that arise because of shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict, they exacerbate the shareholder-manager agency conflict by reducing the manager's incentive to exert effort. This leads to several empirical implications. Because participating policies mitigate the risk-shifting and underinvestment problems, firms with a higher propensity to shift risk, and firms with greater incentives to forgo positive NPV projects would rely more on participating policies. Thus, the authors expect firms with high default risk, or equivalently, firms with poor financial rating, to rely more on participating policies. Also, if a firm's investment is controlled by the policyholders (as in firms with separate accounts) or is monitored by the policyholders (as in firms with several group insurance buyers), the authors would expect to see a lower reliance on participating policies by such firms.
Conversely, because participating policies exacerbate the shareholder-manager agency conflict, the authors would expect firms that use participating policies to be firms that have less need for managerial effort and expertise. Thus, firms that use participating policies are more likely to be operating in fewer lines of business, or in fewer 5
Using the definition of geographic locations, or have more stringent external regulations that restrain managerial discretion. In the next section, the authors describe the variables used to explain the extent of participating policy usage.
DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATING POLICY USAGE

Default Risk
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the problem of risk shifting arises because of the adverse incentives of limited liability. Therefore, the problem is most significant among firms for which the value of limited liability is the highest, i.e., among firms with high default risk. The underinvestment problem arises for insurers in which a large fraction of the returns from a project accrue to the fixed claimholders, that is, for firms in which there are more bankruptcy states or, equivalently, for firms with a higher probability of default. The authors would therefore expect firms with higher default risk to use more participating policies because participating policies help mitigate the contracting costs of risk shifting and underinvestment. Cummins and Danzon (1997) use insurer financial ratings as a measure of default risk. In a similar vein, the authors use A.M. Best's ratings as a measure of default risk. The ratings are transformed into an ordered numeric variable wherein a higher number corresponds to a higher Best rating.
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The authors would expect a negative relation between the Best ratings and the extent of participating policy usage.
Asset Risk
Garven and Pottier (1995) model the risk-shifting problem in insurance firms as the manifestation of the adverse incentives of shareholders when they choose between two risky asset portfolios. Similar to the intuition in prior studies (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Green, 1984) , they show that when the probability of insolvency is sufficiently high, shareholders have an incentive to select the riskier asset portfolio, even if it is detrimental to overall firm value. This increases the contracting costs due to shareholder-policyholder conflicts, and the resulting costs are imposed on the shareholders. Garven and Pottier (1995) go on to show that issuing participating policies mitigates the risk-shifting incentives because participating policies allow the policyholders to also share in the upside potential of the riskier portfolios. This therefore renders riskier asset portfolios suboptimal to the shareholders in firms that issue participating policies. Hence, the authors would expect a negative relation between the riskiness of asset portfolios and the extent of usage of participating policies. Following Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) , the authors use the ratio of common stock investments to invested assets to measure the risk of the insurers' asset portfolio. 6 The A.M. Best insurer financial rating is an ordered categorical variable with ten levels. The letter ratings are converted to numerical ratings as follows: A++=10, A+=9, A=8, A-=7, B++=6, B+=5, B=4, B-=3, C++ and below=2, and not rated=1. Ratings below C++ were combined to form one group because of the small number of insurers with ratings lower than B-. This definition of the rating variable is analogous to the one used in Adiel (1996, p. 326) , and Mayers and Smith (1990, p. 28) .
Separate accounts enable policyholders to choose their investments and the desired risk level of the investments (Black and Skipper, 1994) . Thus, the potential for shareholders to forgo positive NPV investments or to behave opportunistically at the expense of policyholders is substantially reduced with separate accounts. Consequently, the authors expect that insurers with a higher proportion of assets in separate accounts will have lower contracting costs due to risk-shifting and underinvestment and, hence, will have lower proportions of participating policies.
Permanent Life Insurance in Force
Hansmann (1985) and Smith (1986, 1988) argue that the incentive conflict between shareholders and policyholders is more severe with long-term contracts because shareholders have more opportunities to change investment, dividend, and financing policies to the detriment of policyholders. Besides, with longer term contracts, the policies are repriced less frequently because the policyholders are locked in for a longer period of time. Thus, the costs associated with shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts are higher for firms with more long-term contracts. The authors would, therefore, expect participating policy usage to be positively associated with the proportion of life insurance in force that is of a permanent (long-term) nature.
Age
Controlling for firm age is important because of the cumulative effect of issuing participating policies over time. Because older firms have survived the longest, they are more likely to be ones that have chosen positive NPV investments and less risky investments over time; i.e., they are more likely to be the firms that have successfully mitigated the risk-shifting and underinvestment incentives of shareholders. Therefore, if participating policy usage were indeed associated with an abatement of shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts, the authors would expect older firms to have higher proportions of participating policies. Firm age is defined as the total number of years an insurer has been in business. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Smith and Watts (1992) argue that regulated firms are less likely to engage in asset substitution and underinvestment because regulatory authorities act as surrogate monitors and supervise management's decisions. Furthermore, Smith (1986) notes that regulation limits managerial discretion in investment and operating decisions. Thus, regulation is a potential control mechanism over the incentive conflicts that arise within an insurance firm, and regulated firms will find only a limited need for conflict mitigation through participating policies. The authors would therefore expect lower participating policy usage among regulated firms.
Regulation
To the extent that the stringency of New York insurance regulations controls the shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts, insurers licensed in New York should be less likely to use participating policies. The authors include an indicator variable that equals one if an insurer is licensed to operate in New York and zero otherwise, to control for potential regulatory effects. 7 
Group Insurance Buyers
In the life insurance industry, group business is made up primarily of group contracts for life insurance, annuities, and health insurance sold to employers for coverage of their employees. The larger exposure of the typical group insurance contract combined with a more knowledgeable buyer make it more likely that group insurance buyers have greater incentives to monitor and are also likely to have relatively lower monitoring costs compared to individual insurance buyers. This offsets the need for participating insurance contracts to mitigate shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts. Thus, the costs of the shareholder-policyholder conflict are expected to be lower in firms that have more group insurance buyers. In addition, Pottier and Sommer (1997) argue that group insurance involves more managerial discretion than individual life insurance in negotiating rates and contract terms. Therefore, mitigation of shareholder-manager incentive conflicts is crucial for these firms, and the authors would expect that stock insurers with group insurance contracts would use fewer participating policies because these policies exacerbate shareholder-manager conflicts. The authors measure this variable as the ratio of group life insurance in force to the total life insurance in force.
Group Membership
Insurers that are part of a group might require more managerial discretion because of the additional complexity of group operations, such as inter-company transactions and capital allocations, and performance comparisons with affiliates. The managerial disincentives created by participating policies suggest that these firms especially are less likely to use participating policies because managerial discretion is crucial in these firms. Thus, the authors would expect a negative association between being a group member and the extent of participating policy usage. The authors measure group membership using an indicator variable that is 1 if an insurer is a group member, and 0 otherwise.
Geographic Concentration
Mayers and Smith (1981, 1988) argue that operating in a wider geographic area requires more managerial discretion and that the costs of monitoring managers increase with geographic dispersion. The authors would therefore expect participating policy usage by firms operating in a wider geographic area to be lower than that of firms operating in a more concentrated area because participating policies increase the cost of shareholder-manager conflicts. As in Mayers and Smith (1990) , the authors use the number of states in which an insurer is licensed to measure geographic concentration. The authors would expect a negative relation between this variable and participating policy usage. 7 Pottier and Sommer (1998) find that it is important to control for the effect of New York regulation because of significant differences between insurers that are licensed in New York and those that are not.
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Line-of-Business Concentration Firms that operate in many lines of business require more managerial discretion than those that are more focused (Mayers and Smith, 1988) . Mitigation of shareholdermanager incentive conflicts is therefore essential for these firms. The authors would therefore expect firms that operate in many lines of business to use smaller proportions of participating policies because participating policies exacerbate shareholdermanager incentive conflicts. As in Smith (1988, 1994) , the authors measure line-of-business concentration with a Herfindahl index based on direct premiums written across lines of business. 
Life Insurance Premiums
The ability of participating policies to control the risk-shifting and underinvestment problems may also be related to the relative significance of life insurance in an insurer's overall product mix. Even if all life insurance is participating, if life insurance premiums are only a small share of an insurer's total premiums, participating policies may not be effective in resolving the shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts. The authors include the proportion of direct premiums derived from life insurance to control for the effect of the overall product mix on participating policy usage. Mayers and Smith (1988) argue that larger firms should be better able to exploit any gains from specialization. Cummins and Zi (1998) further note that larger firms have higher economies of scale and scope. These economies of scale and scope imply that larger firms are presented with a wider array of investment opportunities than are smaller firms, which enable those firms to more easily substitute riskier projects for less risky ones. The authors would, therefore, expect larger firms to have higher contracting costs of risk shifting which, in turn, would imply higher usage of participating policies.
Size
An opposite prediction, however, may be inferred from Mayers and Smith (1994) . Firm size would also be related to managerial discretion because larger firms engage in more complex activities that require more managerial discretion. Therefore, if participating policies exacerbate the shareholder-manager incentive conflicts, the authors would expect to see lower usage of participating policies among larger firms. Thus, the marginal effect of firm size on participating policy usage is an empirical question, because it is a function of which one of these two effects, risk-shifting or managerial discretion, dominates. The authors define size as the natural logarithm of total assets. Using the classification in Pottier and Sommer (1997) , the authors define the line-of-business concentration measure based on the following ten lines of business: ordinary life, group life, individual annuity, group annuity, individual accident and health (A&H), group A&H, industrial life, credit life, credit A&H, and other.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Research Design and Measures of Participating Policy Usage
The authors conduct tests of the hypotheses using two different measures of participating policy usage as dependent variables in regressions. The first measure is based on the proportion of life insurance in force at year-end 1995 that is classified as participating (PARYE%). The second measure is based on the proportion of life insurance in force issued during the year 1995 that is classified as participating (PARCY%). Because the authors' dependent variables are zero for a significant number of firms, using ordinary least squares would be inappropriate because of the truncation of the dependent variable (see Greene, 1997) . Therefore, the authors estimate the model using two different estimation procedures. A tobit regression is estimated as the basic model and includes both firms that issue participating policies and firms that do not. The tobit regression allows estimation of a single equation to determine whether the authors' independent variables influence the decision to have participating policies as well as the decision regarding the extent of usage.
As an alternative to the tobit regression, the authors estimate two separate equations-a probit regression on all sample firms for the decision to issue participating policies, and an ordinary least squares regression for the subset of firms that issue participating policies. In the probit regression, the dependent variable is one for firms that have participating policies based on the respective measure of participating policy usage (i.e., year-end level or current-year activity) and zero if no policies are classified as participating. This variable is denoted PARYE and PARCY for the measure based on year-end level and current-year activity, respectively. Note that, based on this definition, the sample for which PARCY = 1 is a subset of the sample for which PARYE = 1. In the ordinary least squares regression, the dependent variable is a continuous measure of participating policy usage for firms that have participating policies. Although the authors' hypotheses do not imply a different expected coefficient sign on the independent variables for the decision to have participating policies versus the intensity of usage among firms that have participating policies, the two separate equations allow for differing coefficient signs and magnitudes, unlike the singleequation tobit model.
Data
The authors' sample is obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Life-Health Annual Statement database for the 1995 data year. The ex-
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In separately estimating two models, there is a potential for sample selection bias. This is because the likelihood of participating policy usage may not be independent of the extent of usage. The authors test for potential sample selection bias using the Heckman (1979) method. The Heckman (1979) method involves estimation of the Inverse Mills ratios (IMR) using the predicted probability values from the first stage binary probit model. The IMR enters the second stage regression as an additional regressor. The null hypothesis of no sample selection bias is rejected when the coefficient on the IMR variable is significantly different from zero (see Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997; Greene, 1997) . The authors did not find evidence of sample selection bias and therefore estimated the two models separately. The IMR variable is omitted from the model because the authors did not find evidence of sample selection bias.
hibit of life insurance in the annual statement of life insurers reports the dollar amount of participating and nonparticipating life insurance in force issued during the year and the total at year-end.
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Premium data is not reported separately for participating and nonparticipating life insurance, limiting the authors to participating policy usage measures based on life insurance in force.
A life-health insurer must sell life insurance policies to be included in the sample because health insurance policies are not issued on a participating basis. Because the authors' focus is on the usage of participating policies by stock insurers, only "pure" stock firms are included (i.e., firms not owned by a mutual).
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The insurer must also have positive direct and net premiums, and positive capital and surplus. These criteria are intended to eliminate inactive firms and insolvent firms. The use of two different measures of the dependent variable results in two samples of insurers because some insurers have participating life insurance policies in force at year-end, but they did not issue participating policies in the current year. That is, the first sample includes stock insurers that have life insurance in force at year-end, while the second sample includes only stock insurers that issued life insurance during the year 1995. The first sample consists of 878 stock insurers, of which 348 have participating policies and 530 do not. The second sample consists of 788 stock insurers, of which 137 have participating policies and 651 do not. Selected summary statistics for the authors' samples of insurers with participating policies and those without participating policies are shown in Table 1 . Stock life insurers in the sample had on average about $9.37 billion of total life insurance in force, and about $1.21 billion of participating life insurance as of year-end 1995. The mean fraction of participating policy usage is 8.4 percent, while the median is 0 because only 348 of the sample of 878 firms have participating policies as of year-end 1995. The average life insurance in force issued during the year 1995 is about $1.94 billion, with about $175 million of it being participating insurance policies. The average fraction of participating policy usage is 7.1 percent for insurers issuing life insurance during the year. The two measures of participating policy usage, PARYE% and PARCY%, are highly correlated, with a Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.78.
In Table 2 , the authors present some characteristics of firms with participating policies and those without participating policies. In Panel A of Table 2 , the authors report the characteristics of firms that had life insurance policies as of year-end 1995, while in Panel B they report the characteristics of firms that issued life insurance policies 10 The exhibit of life insurance includes both variable and nonvariable life insurance. On the exhibit of life insurance, a policy that is eligible to receive dividends is classified as "participating" and can include individual, group, industrial, or credit life insurance. In addition, participating insurance can be term, permanent (whole life), variable, or universal life insurance. For instance, variable life insurance is sometimes issued on a participating basis where the dividend is a function of mortality and expense savings (Black and Skipper, 1994) . Note that the annual statement does not report the amount of universal life, variable life, or variable universal life. 11 Mayers and Smith (1994) argue that the activities of mutual-owned stocks should be similar to those of mutual companies. Because the authors only use "pure" stock companies in the sample, mutual-owned stocks are eliminated. This approach is similar to Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) . during the year 1995. The general patterns of the variables are virtually identical in both panels. The results indicate that firms with participating policies are larger, have higher proportions of permanent life insurance, are older, have lower proportions of group life insurance, and have higher proportions of premiums from life insurance policies than firms without participating policies. This pattern is consistent with the argument that participating policies are used by firms that have a need to mitigate the contracting costs of risk shifting. Table 2 also indicates that firms issuing participating policies are more likely to be affiliated to a group and are more likely to be geographically diversified. These results are, in general, not consistent with the view that firms whose shareholder-manager incentive conflicts are high rely less on participating policies. In the following section, the authors analyze the effect of the trade-off between the shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict and the shareholder-manager incentive conflict on participating policy usage using tobit, probit, and OLS regressions.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tobit Model Results
The results of the tobit regressions that analyze the determinants of participating policy usage are presented in Table 3 . Columns 3 and 4 of the table report the coefficients and p-values of the independent variables using the percentage of participating policies as of year-end 1995, PARYE%, as the dependent variable. The corresponding numbers using the percentage of participating policies issued during 1995, PARCY%, as the dependent variable are reported in the last two columns (Columns 5 12 The variables that are significant in the regressions have the expected sign, providing evidence for the theory that participating policy usage is dictated by the level of risk shifting and underinvestment problems in firms, and by the requirement for managerial effort and expertise. Not surprisingly, considering the number of explanatory variables, multicollinearity is present in our four regression models. To examine its effects, the authors ran stepwise regressions (using a p-value of .15) on all four models to reduce the number of explanatory variables. The authors' results were qualitatively unchanged; all variables that are significant before running the stepwise procedure remain so and retain the same sign. Moreover, multicollinearity is no longer serious in the reduced variable set based on the condition numbers (values are below 20) (see Greene, 1997, p. 422 Note: RATING=numerical version of A.M. Best rating, see footnote 6; STOCKS=common stock investments divided by invested assets; SEPACCT=separate account assets divided by total admitted assets; PERMLIFE=whole life insurance in force divided by total life insurance in force; GRPMEM=1 if insurer is a group member, 0 otherwise; AGE=years in business; NYREG=1 if insurer is licensed in New York, 0 otherwise; GRPLIFE=group life insurance in force divided by total life insurance in force; STATES=number of states licensed; LOBHERF=Herfindahl line-of-business concentration index; LIFEDPW=life direct premiums written divided by total direct premiums written; LN(ASSETS)=natural log of total admitted assets; PARCY%=percentage of life insurance in force issued during the year that is participating.
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For instance, the significant coefficients of rating, separate accounts, long-term life insurance in force, and age provide strong support for the argument that participating policy usage is driven by the need to mitigate contracting costs of risk shifting and underinvestment, while the significant coefficient of geographic concentration is consistent with the view that participating policy usage exacerbates shareholdermanager incentive conflicts.
The negative and significant coefficient of the rating variable is consistent with the theory that poorly rated firms (i.e., firms that have higher default risk and higher potential for risk shifting and underinvestment) use more participating policies. The coefficient of the separate accounts variable, SEPACCT, is negative and significant in the PARYE% model. This result is consistent with the argument that the potential for shareholders to behave opportunistically to the detriment of policyholders is substantially reduced with separate accounts, thereby reducing the need for participating policies in these firms. Note: RATING=numerical version of A.M. Best rating, see footnote 6; STOCKS=common stock investments divided by invested assets; SEPACCT=separate account assets divided by total admitted assets; PERMLIFE=whole life insurance in force divided by total life insurance in force; GRPMEM=1 if insurer is a group member, 0 otherwise; AGE=years in business; NYREG=1 if insurer is licensed in New York, 0 otherwise; GRPLIFE=group life insurance in force divided by total life insurance in force; STATES=number of states licensed; LOBHERF=Herfindahl line-of-business concentration index; LIFEDPW=life direct premiums written divided by total direct premiums written; LN(ASSETS)=natural log of total admitted assets; PARYE%=percentage of life insurance in force at year-end that is participating; PARCY%=percentage of life insurance in force issued during the year that is participating.
The coefficient of the variable measuring the proportion of invested assets in common stocks, STOCKS, is negative but marginally insignificant in the PARYE% model, and it is negative and significant in the PARCY% model. This result provides some support for the hypothesis that participating policies bond the insurer to choose a less risky portfolio by partially merging the shareholder and policyholder roles. This result, however, must be qualified by the fact that because stocks are typically longer term investments, they should have a stronger effect on PARYE% than on PARCY%.
Counter to this notion, the authors' results indicate that STOCKS has a significant effect on PARCY% but not on PARYE%. This suggests that participating policies only partly affect the riskiness of insurer portfolios, and other variables perhaps more completely determine the riskiness.
The coefficient of the variable measuring the proportion of life insurance in force that is permanent, PERMLIFE, is positive and significant in both the PARCY% and PARYE% models.
14 This result is consistent with the claim that long-term insurance contracts provide more opportunities for shareholder-policyholder conflicts, and that participating insurance contracts help mitigate these incentive conflicts and the associated costs. The age variable is positive and significant in the PARYE% model, implying that older insurers are more likely to issue participating policies. These results are consistent with the argument that participating policies should be associated with insurers that have invested over time in positive NPV projects or have chosen less risky investments (perhaps by successfully mitigating the risk-shifting problem) and hence have survived longer. The size variable is positive and significant in both models, suggesting that larger insurers use more participating policies. This result is consistent with the argument that larger insurers have greater opportunities to shift risk onto the policyholders and hence mitigate the associated contracting costs using participating policies. Overall, the authors' results are strongly supportive of the hypothesis that participating policy usage is more prevalent among firms that have higher contracting costs of risk shifting and underinvestment.
One variable that is not significant in the regressions in Table 3 is the proportion of life insurance that is in group policies, GRPLIFE. This may be because GRPLIFE may be made up of both short-term and long-term insurance contracts. If the authors could separate GRPLIFE into short-term and long-term, they would expect opposite signs on the coefficient of the two components. This is because long-term group contracts would behave more like permanent contracts with infrequent repricing and hence greater contracting costs of shareholder-policyholder conflicts. Thus, the lack of significance of GRPLIFE in any of the regressions seems to suggest that the authors may be pooling long-term and short-term GRPLIFE. Furthermore, when they drop PERMLIFE but retain GRPLIFE in the regressions, the coefficient of GRPLIFE continues to be insignificant, again reinforcing the view that the authors may be pooling 14 A point that needs to be mentioned here is that the variables PERMLIFE and GRPLIFE are expected to be negatively correlated with each other, because group policies are likely to be repriced more frequently than individual policies. The correlation between these two variables ranges from -0.39 to -0.59 across different sub-samples. GRPLIFE is not significant in any of the authors' regressions. To test whether the lack of significance of this variable was due to collinearity with PERMLIFE, the authors omitted GRPLIFE and re-estimated the regressions. The authors' results did not change qualitatively. both long-term and short-term policies as part of GRPLIFE. Nevertheless, the evidence regarding the effect of shareholder-policyholder conflicts on participating policy usage is quite robust. To the extent that PERMLIFE is positive and statistically significant, it suggests that longer-term (i.e., less often repriced) insurance contracts are associated with higher contracting costs of shareholder-policyholder conflicts and, thus, the higher need for participating policy usage.
The measure of geographic concentration, STATES, is negative and significant in both the PARCY% and PARYE% models, implying that firms that require more managerial discretion reduce their usage of participating policies, because these policies exacerbate shareholder-manager conflicts. However, LOBHERF, the measure of line-ofbusiness concentration, is not statistically significant in either regression. This implies that firms that are more diversified in their operations, i.e., firms that rely more on managerial effort and discretion are no less likely to rely on participating policies than are other firms. Similarly, GRPMEM, the indicator variable that represents insurance firms that are part of a group, is also not statistically significant in either regression. Thus, the authors' overall evidence offers only limited support for the hypothesis that participating policy usage is lower in firms in which the shareholdermanager agency conflicts are higher.
Finally, the coefficient of the control variable measuring the proportion of premiums in life insurance, LIFEDPW, is positive and significant in both models in Table 3 , implying that insurers that derive more of their premiums from life insurance are more likely to issue participating policies.
Probit Likelihood and OLS Usage Model Results
As an alternative to the tobit single equation model, the authors also study separately the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood of issuing participating policies, and on the extent of usage of participating policies. By separating the decision to issue participating policies from the extent of usage of these policies, the authors can draw conclusions on whether the effect of the independent variables is different across the two models. The authors use a probit equation to study the decision to issue and an OLS equation to study the extent of usage.
The authors use an indicator variable as the dependent variable in the probit likelihood regressions. This variable takes the value 1 for firms that have some participating policies in force, and 0 otherwise. Again, the authors measure participating policies as of year-end 1995 (PARYE), and issued during the year 1995 (PARCY). The results of the probit likelihood regressions are presented in Table 4 . A positive coefficient of a right-hand side variable indicates a positive association between that variable and the probability of issuing participating life insurance policies. Most of the variables that were significant in the tobit regressions remain significant in the probit likelihood regression, indicating that the likelihood of issuing participating policies is also affected by the trade-off between mitigating risk shifting and underinvestment, and maintaining managerial discretion. An exception is the rating variable that is no longer significant in the probit regressions even though it was statistically significant in the tobit regressions. This implies that firms with lower default risk, i.e., firms with lower contracting costs of risk shifting and underinvestment, are just as likely as other firms to issue participating policies. However, the extent of usage regressions in Table 5 indicates that when they issue participating policies, lower-rated firms issue significantly more participating policies than other firms. This result is consistent with the view that firms with greater contracting costs of risk-shifting and underinvestment rely more on participating policies. Another exception is the LOBHERF variable. This variable is not significant in the tobit regressions in Table 3 , but is negative and significant in the probit model in Table 4 . This may be because of the positive correlation between LIFEDPW and
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LOBHERF (correlation = 0.22 in the PARYE model and 0.25 in the PARCY model). To verify whether collinearity affected the robustness of the results, the authors omitted LOBHERF from the regressions. However, none of the results changed qualitatively. More importantly, because participating policies impose a cost on firms in which managerial discretion is crucial, the authors expect that participating policy usage will be low in firms in which managerial discretion is especially important, such as in diversified firms (i.e., in firms with low LOBHERF). Thus, the authors expect that this variable will be more important in the extent of usage models rather than in the probit models. Indeed, the regression results in Table 5 bear out this conjecture. In Table 5 , the authors present the results of the OLS extent of usage regressions. These regressions use only the sample of firms that have participating policies in force. The dependent variable in these regressions is the proportion of life insurance in force at year-end that is considered participating (PARYE%), and the proportion of life insurance issued during the year that is participating (PARCY%). Again, the results are similar to the results of the tobit regressions. Below, the authors discuss some of the incremental results obtained in this model.
The binary variable indicating whether an insurer is a group member, GRPMEM, is negative and significant in the PARYE% model, indicating that insurers that are group members use smaller proportions of participating policies. This is consistent with the view that insurers that operate in a group require more managerial discretion and, consequently, seek to minimize the use of participating policies because these policies reduce managerial effort. The binary variable indicating whether an insurer is licensed in New York, NYREG, is positive and significant in the PARYE% and PARCY% models, implying that New York licensed insurers use higher proportions of participating policies, contrary to the authors' regulation hypothesis.
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The measures of geographic concentration and line-of-business concentration, STATES and LOBHERF, are significant and with the expected signs in both the PARYE% and PARCY% models, implying that more diversified firms require more managerial discretion, and so minimize their usage of participating policies because these policies exacerbate shareholder-manager incentive conflicts. As one referee noted, competition with mutual insurance firms is a potential explanation for the use of participating policies by stock insurers. The positive association between being licensed in New York and using more participating policies is consistent with that argument because a significantly higher proportion of New York licensed life insurers are mutuals (see Pottier and Sommer, 1998). 16 Besides the agency theory related variables, the authors also explored the role of competition in determining participating policy usage. Belth (1965) argues that participating policies may be issued by stock insurers in order to compete more effectively with mutuals. To test this hypothesis, for each firm in the sample, the authors created a variable to proxy for the intensity of competition with mutuals. This variable is computed as follows: iijj j CSM = ∑ , where ij S is the proportion of stock insurer i's life insurance premiums in state j, and j M is the market share of mutual life insurers in state j. The authors wanted a variable that would be an increasing function of the level of competition with mutual insurers. This variable is higher for stock companies that write relatively more of their premiums in states in which mutuals have a relatively higher market share. If a stock insurer uses participating policies to mimic mutual insurers, then the authors would expect to find a positive relation between the competition variable and participating policy usage. The authors included the competition variable as an additional regressor in the analysis, but the variable was not significant in any regression. Thus, the authors' evidence does not support the competition hypothesis. Though these results are not reported in the tables, they are available from the authors on request.
CONCLUSION
Several studies have developed analytical models providing insights into the role of participating insurance contracts in stock insurance firms. For instance, Smith (1981, 1986 ) and Garven and Pottier (1995) argue that participating policies resolve the shareholder-policyholder incentive conflicts in insurance firms. Mayers and Smith (1994) argue that participating policies may also exacerbate the shareholder-manager agency problem, by reducing the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in disciplining the manager. In this article, the authors study whether hypotheses derived from the agency literature explain the usage of participating policies by stock insurers.
First, the authors formally demonstrate how participating policies exacerbate another dimension of the shareholder-manager incentive conflict. In a model in which managerial effort is positively correlated with profitability, the authors show that managers exert less effort when the firm issues participating policies than when the firm issues only nonparticipating policies. To the authors' knowledge, they are the first to show this result analytically. Agency theory, therefore, suggests that participating policies would be more likely in firms for which the costs of shareholder-policyholder incentive conflict dominate the costs of shareholder-manager incentive conflict.
Using variables that capture the extent of risk-shifting and underinvestment problems, and the need for managerial discretion in stock insurers, the authors examine for systematic differences between stock life insurers that issue participating policies and those that do not. The determinants of the extent of usage of participating policies among insurers that issue participating policies are also investigated. The authors' results indicate that the patterns of participating policy usage by stock insurance companies are consistent with the agency theory trade-off between mitigating risk shifting and underinvestment and minimizing costs of shareholder-manager incentive conflicts. The results strongly support the role of participating policies in resolving shareholder-policyholder incentive problems, but also generally support the effect of participating policies in exacerbating the shareholder-manager conflicts.
